Moldova’s alignment with Western sanctions draws Russia’s hybrid wrath
Republished from Euractiv April 3, 2024
Welcome back to Moldova Matters! Starting in January 2024 I have begun writing for Euractiv as a freelance writer covering Moldova in a new series of articles sponsored by EMIF. Euractiv is a leading English language news agency covering the European Union and Eastern Partnership countries. Articles will come out every 2 months and can be read on Euractiv, in their “Capitals” newsletter and re-printed here on Moldova Matters.
Link to the original article on Euractiv
Moldova’s decision to join the EU’s sanctions regime against Russia last November has fueled Moscow’s already vast campaign of disinformation and hybrid warfare against the EU candidate country.
“We regard this as yet another hostile step by the Moldovan leadership, which is fully integrated into the anti-Russian campaign of the ‘collective West’,” Russia’s Foreign Ministry responded in a statement.
The language, as well as a vague threat that Russia won’t “leave unanswered” the decision to join the sanctions, have become commonplace, part of a larger campaign of Russian disinformation aimed at destabilising Moldova and bringing it back into Moscow’s orbit.
‘Collective West’ narrative
One of the key narratives deployed by Russia and its proxies in Moldova is that the country is being controlled by, or subsumed into, the “collective West”.
This narrative is peddled through multiple spheres including security, economics and history. In terms of security, Russian messaging warns that Moldova is losing its neutrality and planning to join NATO. In economic terms, they claim, the decision to forgo Russian gas is hurting average citizens.
In terms of history, campaigns seek to link Moldova to the “Russian World”.
Most recently, this included a statement by the spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, chastising Moldovan leaders for being insufficiently grateful for the “liberation” by Russia from the Ottoman Empire in 1812.
Central to the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns are two parallel strands. First, creating the perception of instability and danger in the country, and second, promising various incentives and subsidies for “friendship” with Russia.
To cause insecurity and instability, Russian narratives say Moldova is being “pulled into” the war in Ukraine. These stories highlight the threat of instability in Transnistria, a breakaway region within Moldova controlled by the Kremlin and occupied by Russian soldiers.
Most recently, security concerns were voiced in a set of poorly sourced rumours implying that the Transnistrian authorities would request annexation to Russia in late February, which Putin would allegedly quickly grant.
This story was largely dismissed as uncredible in Moldova, receiving scant coverage and even less official acknowledgement… until it made it into the Western media.
This resulted in a flurry of extraordinary alarmist stories which at times speculated that Russian tanks would be in the capital Chisinau imminently. In the end, no request for annexation was made.
Moldova has called this a disinformation operation. If so, it was a highly successful one. The drumbeat of worrisome security stories is partly designed to scare away international investors.
Following weeks of uneasy Transnistria news, Japanese auto parts maker Fujikura announced they were closing a plant in Comrat because their main client, Volkswagen, “decided to transfer the production of parts for its cars from Moldova to a NATO country”.
As a result of aligning with EU sanctions, Moldova has blocked exports from three Transnistrian factories to Russia, citing the “dual use” nature of the manufactured components, meaning they could be used for military purposes.
This, combined with a new customs code requiring Transnistrian companies registered in Moldova to pay the same taxes as other Moldovan companies, has caused serious economic pain for the breakaway region.
Russia has no direct ways to respond economically and instead uses threats, disinformation, active measures, and hybrid war tactics.
Another and perhaps more important purpose of these disinformation campaigns is to fracture public opinion in Moldovan society.
Implicit and explicit threats of expanding the war in Ukraine to Moldova are always couched in terms of a choice – Moldova can either join NATO and the “collective West” or embrace its constitutional neutrality.
Neutrality has become a buzzword for pro-Kremlin political figures and parties who use it as an argument against investing in national defence and against closer relations with Europe.
No party in Moldova seeks NATO membership and a recent public opinion poll showed only 28.5% support for joining the alliance and 55.4% against it. This contrasts sharply with the same poll showing that 54.5% would vote for joining the EU and only 30.5% would vote against.
Polls in Moldova only survey voters who reside in the country and do not include voters abroad, who make up a large pro-EU voting block.
Russia and its proxies are trying to exploit this disparity in public opinion to anchor the security risks in the public narrative while deemphasizing the economic benefits of joining the EU.
Russian campaigns also propose a series of carrots in the form of populist economic promises.
Lately, these promises have been conveyed by the Bashkan (governor) of Gagauzia Evghenia Gutsul.
A member of the Shor party, Gutsul recently travelled to Sochi, southern Russia, where she met with Vladimir Putin and petitioned him for cheap natural gas deliveries to Gagauzia.
She also publicly asked for help in routing money from Ilan Shor, a controversial Moldovan oligarch sentenced in absentia for fraud and money laundering, and other “sponsors” through Russian banks to avoid Moldovan jurisdiction.
Ilan Shor has been sanctioned by multiple countries and blocs including the US, UK, Canada, and the EU for attempts to destabilise Moldova’s democracy and interfere in Moldovan elections on behalf of Russia.
This money would supposedly be given to Gagauzian residents. Prime Minister Dorin Recean has called these “false promises” by a “criminal group” and noted that the Shor party regularly makes empty populist economic pledges of this kind.
Together, the message Russia is conveying is clear: Closer ties to Europe are equated with closer ties to NATO. All “unfriendly” actions, including aligning with EU sanctions, pose a threat to Moldovan security – which is emphasised in fear-mongering disinformation campaigns.
But drop that, and Russia will offer cheap energy and various economic benefits, according to promises delivered via proxy politicians.
Throughout 2024 Russia will likely continue to employ disinformation and hybrid warfare to push this set of messages and undermine Moldova’s democratic government, especially leading up to elections in November.
This article is part of the FREIHEIT media project on Europe’s Neighbourhood, funded by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF).
[Edited by Alexandra Brzozowski/Zoran Radosavljevic]