What's Going on in Transnistria?
What's Going on in Transnistria?
Quick Hit: Will the region seek annexation by Russia next week?
Today’s article is a bit different than our normal fare at Moldova Matters. We’re going to take a look at a swirl of rumors, statements and predictions being made regarding Transnistria. Specifically about whether or not Transnistria will appeal to the Kremlin requesting to be annexed into the Russian Federation. What makes this article different than most at Moldova Matters is that this story is largely driven by international press and social media conversations and not local Moldovan news. I honestly cannot think of another time where so much focus has been put on Moldovan affairs in the English language press while the Moldovan press and civil society are more or less ambivalent. We’ll dive into this aspect of the story below.
This article will focus firstly on the hard news, such as it is, and then on my analysis of the situation and of the various commentary swirling around the internet. We’ll be back soon with a proper Weekly Roundup.
Russian Statements and Rumors of Annexation
In last week’s roundup we noted a report from the Institute for the Study of War ISW that focused on increasingly aggressive Russian rhetoric and disinformation. The ISW assessed that the Kremlin was “setting conditions” in the information environment that were highly similar to those used by Russia in the run up to the full scale invasion of Ukraine in January 2022. The report concluded that:
“The timing of a possible Russian hybrid operation in Moldova is unclear, but the Kremlin is setting informational conditions to make it possible soon.”
Primarily this report referred to disinformation and Russian media statements disseminated through Kremlin channels and affiliated social media networks, primarily Telegram. But it also coincided with statements from senior Kremlin officials which Balkan Insight wrote about this week.
These include statements from Russian Foreign Secretary Serghei Lavrov :
“We will do everything we can to reverse this trend to resume the political process. After all, we have 200,000 citizens living there, and, of course, we are concerned about their fate and will not allow them to become victims of another Western adventure,”
From Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Galuzin :
“We are extremely concerned about such a possibility and have always made it clear that attempts to resolve the Transnistrian issue by force are counterproductive. We expect Chisinau to understand what a military scenario could mean for Moldova,”
… and from Transnistrian “Leader” Vadim Krasnoselsky
“We must try all possible negotiation platforms and not interrupt the dialogue … The conflict in Transnistria is the path to world war,”
Other media outlets including Deutsche Welle also reported on increasingly hostile rhetoric directed towards Moldova from the Kremlin.
At this point it is essential to note that while much international attention was being focused on this rhetoric, the same has not been true in Moldova. As we will detail below the Moldovan authorities, press and civil society have viewed all of this rhetoric in the context of economic tensions with Transnistria and Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare against the country. Russian disinformation in Moldova did not start this month.
The Spark - a Rumor With a Single Source
This week Transnistrian Leader Vadim Krasnoselsky announced that he was calling a "Congress of Local Deputies at all Levels" from the region to discuss “pressure from Moldova, which violates the rights and worsens the socio-economic situation of Transnistrian people.” This “congress” will gather together the “elected” representatives in Transnistria from all levels, from the Supreme Soviet down to local town councils and mayors. It has been scheduled for February 28th and no other official information about the agenda or expected outcome has been released.
Following this news, a member of the Transnistrian opposition name Ghenadie Ciorba began making statements in long facebook posts about the purpose of the congress. In part he wrote:
“Most likely, based on the analysis of the situation, a command was issued from Moscow to hold this congress, at which a request should be voiced on behalf of citizens living on the Left Bank to Russia to accept Pridnestrovie [Transnistria] into the Russian Federation, and on February 29 Putin will announce this in its appeal, and the Federal Assembly will quickly decide to satisfy the request. In this case, the organizers will refer to the 2006 referendum,”
Mr. Ciorba noted that Putin will speak on February 29th one day after the event in Transnistria in his annual address to the Federation Assembly. This is his annual “State of the Union” speech and the last one he will give in his current term as President before the March “elections.”
He further stated that the purpose of the annexation would be to provide Russia with the “legal right to attack the territory of the Republic of Moldova.”
Note: Mr. Ciorba stated (incorrectly) that this will only be the 4th time since “independence” that Transnistria has held such a congress. Transnistria has in fact held 6 “Congresses of Local Deputies at all Levels.” Four were held between 1990 and 1992 which declared independence and setup the basic functions of the pseudo-state. Another was held in 1995 to ratify the region’s constitution. The most recent congress was held in 2006. It was nominally called because of “economic pressures” coming from Chisinau and was used to call for a referendum on the future of Transnistria. This “referendum,” which has not been recognized internationally, resulted in a 97% vote to join the Russian Federation and to maintain independence until such a time.
If you have seen any news in the past few days about potential escalation in Transnistria, possibilities of Russian annexation, or other related worries, they all trace back to this single facebook post by Ghenadie Ciorba.
So… who is Ghenadie Ciorba?
Mr. Ciorba is a civic activist opposed to the current Transnistrian regime who previously worked in the Transnistrian executive branch under former “leader” Evgheni Şevciuk. He was expected to run for a seat in the Supreme Soviet before being arrested in 2020 for leading a peaceful protest against the closing of the Râbnița bridge due to COVID restrictions. Mr. Ciorba was released in 2021 after spending a year in prison during which time the United States and Canadian representatives with the OSCE as well as various other national and international human rights groups named him a political prisoner and called for his release.
While it is clear that Mr. Ciorba was held as a political prisoner in the region, it is difficult to evaluate his credibility in this matter. It’s worth noting that Evgheni Şevciuk fled Transnistria following his “election” loss to Vadim Krasnoselsky chased by corruption charges. He left behind an estate that seemed to be a mini-version of that held by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych (without the pirate ship). Şevciuk left multiple mansions, a private pond and park, 5 car garage and small personal armory of machine guns and submachine guns behind.
Reactions to the Spreading Rumor
It is first important to note that the Transnistrian “authorities” have not clearly outlined what the purpose or agenda of the upcoming congress is beyond the statements listed above about “economic coercion.”
Responding to the rumors about the congress, the Moldovan government’s Reintegration Bureau put out the following statement:
"Regarding the information circulating in the public space, regarding the event expected in Tiraspol for the current February 28, we specify that the Reintegration Policy Office is carefully following the situation in the Transnistrian region, being in permanent contact with the OSCE Mission and other international partners. From the information we have, there is no reason to believe that the situation in the region could deteriorate. We are convinced that Tiraspol is aware of the consequences it assumes in case of ill-considered steps"
There have been no other statements from senior government officials directly addressing the congress or any rumors about it.
In terms of the international response, “news” has spread through social media very quickly and appears to be propelled by English language Russian bots or promoters on twitter and through various Telegram channels.
The ISW put out a tweet warning that the congress may be used to organize a referendum on the region’s annexation into Russia. They state:
"ISW offers this assessment as a warning for a high-impact event of indetermined probability."
ISW went on to note that Putin would be unlikely to quickly move to annex the region, but may instead simply welcome the holding of a referendum and state that the Kremlin would monitor the situation.
Ukraine’s Reaction
Interesting context for all that has gone on in the last few days has been a simultaneous major uptick in Ukrainian diplomacy on the topic of Transnistria. Ukraine’s Ambassador-at-Large Paun Rohovei, who is responsible for topics concerning Transnistria, came to Chisinau this week and met with Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Oleg Serebrian. Following the meeting the Reintegration Bureau stated that the men discussed recent developments in Transnistria and Minister Serebrian stressed both Moldova’s commitment to a peaceful solution and determination to continue with gradual economic re-integration.
Ambassador Rohovei then met with Transnistrian “leader” Krasnoselsky on February 19th in Tiraspol. The readout of the meeting showed both sides stressing established talking points: Transnistria wants the resumption of the 5+2 talks, Ukraine (and Moldova) refuse to resume talks with Russia while the war is ongoing. Ukraine wants the removal of Russian troops and replacement with civilian peacekeepers, Transnistria does not, etc. Interestingly, there were more productive points. The two parties discussed grain and goods transit through Transnistria by rail and the Ukrainian Ambassador indicated that Kyiv would be willing to re-open their consulate in Transnistria so long as security and freedom of movement were assured for their diplomats. Ukraine also took the chance to warn Transnistria against “provocations” saying:
“Kyiv will react decisively to any provocations aimed at dragging the Transnistrian region into Russia’s war against Ukraine and destabilizing the situation in Moldova.”
Following this meeting Ambassador-at-Large Paun Rohovei traveled to Brussels and on February 21st met with EU Special Representative for the Transnistrian settlement Dorota D. Suliga. The readout of this meeting stressed normal talking points such as playing a constructive role, peaceful settlement, etc.
On February 23rd, spokesman for Ukraine’s Military Intelligence GRU Andrey Yusov directly addressed the rumors about annexation saying:
“According to our data, the information that on February 28 the “authorities” of Transnistria will allegedly ask the Russian Federation to annex them into its composition is not confirmed at the moment.”
Ukraine’s Ambassador to Moldova has also stated that he does not believe these rumors about Transnistria seeking annexation.
Statements from Moldovan Experts
Moldovan experts interviewed about the ongoing rumors and concerns have largely dismissed talk of annexation and emphasized Transnistria and Russia’s use of disinformation in support of a hybrid war against Moldova. Specially they note the economic rather than military nature of the underlying concerns and the lack of any logic in a move to annex part of Moldova.
Watchdog.md director and political expert Valeriu Pasa stated:
"Why do I think that Putin is not ready to recognize or even more accept the Transnistrian region in the Russian Federation, because he does not have border control of this region. This is not the case, for example, with the separatist regions of Georgia, as long as the Russian army cannot reach this territory, it is very unlikely that he will take the risk of accepting this region in quotation marks as part of the Russian Federation. He won't be able to show her up in case of anything."
Though he did note that Putin has taken “suicidal” steps before.
Former Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Alexandru Flenchea stated the following in an interview with Zona de Securitate:
"… this will be the second congress since Sheriff became the only political force in Transnistria. This happens when the Sheriff feels threatened by the greenhouse conditions in which he is used to operating. Conditions that do not involve the payment of taxes and customs. This is how the upcoming congress should be viewed. Tiraspol thought long and hard how to react. As far as pressure levers go, the toolbox is pretty much exhausted. They cannot change the situation, so obviously there will be steps in congress. It's hard to say yet how serious these will be. It is clear that there will be some confrontations at the level of statements",
Analysis - What’s Going on Here?
In order to try and pick apart a very complex situation it is important to set out some baseline facts and assumptions:
The Transnistrian “authorities” are not decision makers here. Any major decisions about the regions future are being made in Moscow. The local elite have preferences (more on that below) and some limited agency, but the Kremlin is in charge.
These rumors are being amplified in western social media. It is *possible* to squint and imagine a Romanian language facebook post from an internationally unknown Transnistrian dissident going viral in the tinderbox of hostile Russian statements about Moldova. Possible, but not likely. Pro-Russian accounts (with their blue-checkmarks) on Twitter / X are heavily promoting this story. The western press and social media rarely pay much attention to Moldova and bringing attention to the country is difficult (believe me, I know). But in a case where literally no local press was focused on this until it rebounded back from the west? That does not seem like coincidence.
We’ll first look at the rumor of annexation on the merits and then move to the counter story of this being more disinformation and hybrid warfare.
Evaluating the “Annexation” Story
When evaluating the “annexation” story on its merits (such as they are) we need to first clear up a few bits of confusion that have resulted in this game of telephone on social media and in the press.
Referendum vs a Decision by the Congress
Various reports suggest that the Transnistrian congress would call for a referendum on the issue of being annexed into Russia on February 28th. This was true of the tweet from the Institute for the Study of War ISW though in their longer article assessing the situation they note that the congress may simply make a decision on the basis of the 2006 referendum.
The idea of calling a referendum neatly counterposes pro-Russian elements in Transnistria with Moldova’s planned referendum on joining the European Union this year. However neat this political messaging might be, it is unlikely that a new referendum would be called given the existing 2006 referendum that the Transnistrian “authorities” can call upon. This was underlined by statements by Vadym Kravchuk, member of the Supreme Council or Transnistria who said this week:
"It makes no sense to hold another referendum, but to confirm the previous decision is appropriate... Transnistria determined the vector [unification] with Russia, with the Eurasian Union back in 2006. The congress of deputies of all levels will most likely confirm our intentions,"
Annexation vs Recognizing Independence
Most coverage has focused on the idea that, should the Transnistrian congress ask for it, Russia would have the choice between annexing the region or setting out some weaker statement whereby they reaffirm promises to protect Transnistria thereby sending a warning while maintaining strategic ambiguity. This doesn’t account for another possibility - recognizing the region’s independence. Currently, no UN member, including Russia, recognizes Transnistria officially. All UN members, including Russia, consider Transnistria to be a part of Moldova.
This contrasts with other “frozen” and hot conflicts which Russia has stoked - notably in Ukraine, but also in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Transnistria has been treated differently by Russia for one reason - natural gas. Russia provides natural gas to Transnistria “free of charge” while sending the bill to Moldova. This has given the Kremlin massive leverage over Moldova historically since the entire country was dependent on Russia for natural gas and on Transnistria for electricity made from this gas. Now, with Moldova fully independent of Russian natural gas and with the transit agreements necessary to moving the gas from Russia to Transnistria expiring in December the Kremlin no longer has the same reasons for considering Transnistria as part of Moldova.
Recognizing the independence of the region would be moderately less provocative than declaring it outright annexed. But it is worth remembering that the 2022 invasion of Ukraine was preceded by just such a recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk so called “People’s Republics.”
Arguments for Annexation / recognizing Independence
Why Putin might do this / signs that it might be real:
Putin’s upcoming election - Putin’s February 29th State of the Union will likely be his last major address before his March re-”election.” While there is no chance of Putin losing the election, various pundits and commentators make the case that he may use this as a moment to unveil a further expansion of the “Russian World.” In perhaps a similar story, the leadership of Abkhazia announced on February 22nd to Russian state media a desire to join the “Union State” of Russia and Belarus. Similar to Transnistria these Russian proxies do not speak without authorization from the center on major issues.
Russia’s long term goal clearly includes Transnistria (and Moldova) - From the beginning of the full scale invasion of Ukraine and long before Putin, has clearly indicated that Moldova is within the Russian sphere of influence and part of the “Russian World.” The Kremlin has consistently spoken of the need to “support” the roughly 200,000 Transnistrians holding Russian citizenship and to protect them against Moldova and NATO. The long term goals of incorporating Transnistria and parts (or all) of Moldova into a reborn empire have never been in doubt.
Putin has acted irrationally before - ‘nuff said.
The traditional Transnistria card has been played - Energy and other tools of coercion previously used by the Kremlin are no longer effective. I wrote about this extensively in my 2024 - The Year Ahead article from January.
Dodon and Shor are in Moscow - Various members of the Socialist Party have been in Moscow this week attending a forum titled “For the Freedom of Nations” hosted by United Russia. The forum declared the need to “fully support the proposal to create on the basis of this forum a political international movement to find ways and methods to protect the sovereignty of countries.” Igor Dodon also attended the forum and had meetings with Patriarch Kirill. As we wrote 2 weeks ago, Ilan Shor has been in Moscow meeting with Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs Leonid Kalashnikov. Kalashnikov sponsored the bill in the lead up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine recognizing the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic’s and was central to organizing the pageantry around these events in the Duma. While both Shor and Dodon periodically travel to Russia the timing and fact that they are both there is worth noting.
Arguments Against Annexation / recognizing Independence
Why Putin would not risk this escalation (at least not now).
Risk of shattering western indecision (for no gain) - So far 2024 has been a year of uncertainty and worry for Ukraine’s western partners. Donald Trump’s threats to pull out of NATO and European failures to manufacture the necessary munitions for Ukraine have left the alliance in a state of indecision and concern. Any attempt Putin would make to annex parts of one or more other countries in this climate would galvanize western support and substantially bolster arguments made by the Baltic States and Poland that Putin’s ambitions go far beyond Ukraine. And for what? As we’ll mention in point 3 below Russia can’t get to Transnistria.
US Congressional aid to Ukraine - At the time of writing it seems more and more unlikely that the United States Congress will overcome the minority of MAGA congressmen who are holding up Ukraine aid. After passage in the Senate, Speaker Mike Johnson announced 2 weeks of vacation for the House. Following this vacation the House will need to urgently pass a government budget with only 3 days to do so before the US government will be forced to shut down. At best this timing pushes consideration of the bill back. At worst, it is part of a tactic by Speaker Johnson to kill the bill at the behest of Donald Trump. At the same time, there is a bipartisan majority in both houses of congress that supports Ukraine aid. Any move by Putin to expand and escalate the conflict risks breaking this logjam at a critical moment. For this the timing is key - there is no clear reason to recognize or annex Transnistria today while there is a clear incentive not to escalate until the bill on aid is fully dead.
Transnistria is landlocked and defenseless - Russia has around 2000 soldiers in Transnistria without any heavy weaponry. It could not reinforce these troops without crossing Ukrainian territory, and Ukraine maintains more than enough military strength along the Transnistrian border to swiftly crush the separatist region. If Russia escalated in the region militarily it would be sacrificing a chess piece to an unclear end.
The “status quo” is the only acceptable outcome to the region’s elite’s - As I wrote last year in the article “Transnistria is in a Pickle” there is only one acceptable outcome for the Transnistrian “state” and elite - the status quo ante. That is to say, the reality before February 2022. We’ll look more at the economic situation below but it is important to remember that the Transnistrian elite do not “win” in a scenario where the region is incorporated into Russia or one where their independence becomes de-facto and they lose access to European markets.
The Hybrid War Case
Moldovan analysts and some politicians have said that all of this is simply more Russian disinformation and hybrid warfare. That there is no real threat of annexation or military escalation but that by presenting a credible threat the Kremlin hopes to get concessions on economic issues from Chisinau - basically that this is all bark and no bite.
To understand this argument we have to re-center the economic questions at the core of the evolving relationship between Chisinau and Tiraspol. This goes beyond simply talking about the imposition by Chisinau of import and export taxes on Transnistrian companies registered in Moldova (aka doing business with the EU). There have been additional recent signs of trouble in the region’s economy. Here are a few:
There are signs of trouble with the Sheriff corporation. Oligarch’s Victor Gușan and Ilya Kazmaly own the company which, in turn, owns the region. Sheriff runs everything from supermarkets to gas stations to car washes to football stadiums to heavy industry. Recently, multiple car washes have closed, shortages for popular products have appears including some brands of cigarettes and the Cement plant in Râbnița (indirectly linked to Sheriff) shut down indefinitely in December. Additionally the Metallurgical Plant has slowed and periodically stopped production due to new EU environmental regulations on the export and import of scrap metal. This regulation requires an independent auditor, and the Moldovan government, to certify the environmental conditions at the plant.
On February 3rd the Transnistrian authorities requested additional natural gas from Russia in order to support their industry. They already consume 100% of the gas Russia has allocated to the whole country.
Customs duties may be more impactful on Transnistrian revenue than previously reported. Political Scientist Marius Ghincea recently estimated that the collection of these taxes and resulting loss of competitiveness in the region might decrease budget revenues for Transnistria by half. This is a much higher estimate than anything previously discussed in the Moldovan press but underlines the fact that these measures have brought economic pain to the region.
For Moldovan experts this all means that the Transnistrian region is largely out of cards to play other than negotiations with Chisinau. In lieu of that move, the Transnistrian “authorities” and the Kremlin are trying to bully and threaten Chisinau into making concessions. They are seeking to warn Chisinau that they still have the ability to be destabilizing and create major political problems for the country.
The main goal being to scare Chisinau into canceling the application of the Customs taxes, or scaring Moldova’s international partners into pushing the government in this direction.
What’s Next
The main thing missing from this article has been any statement by the country’s leadership on this situation. Other than brief statements from the Bureau of Re-Integration no senior figures have commented. That may seem unusual, but over the last few years this government has shown a strange predilection for putting out important statements that they want covered… late on Friday night. So it’s possible that there will be updates later today or over the weekend.
We’ll follow developments and update readers as more information becomes available.