Perspective: Thoughts on the International Crisis Group Report
September 7, 2024
Hi everyone! This article is the first in a new section for Moldova Matters which I’m calling “Perspective.” The idea is that I’m going to take a closer look at some element of the news or life in Moldova and bring my own perspective to the topic at hand. Some of the articles in this section will be opinion, most will be analysis informed from my many years living and working in Moldova. Read more about this new type of content as well as some other editorial changes here.
On August 21st the International Crisis Group published a report titled “Moldova Divided: Easing Tensions as Russia Meddles and Elections Approach.” You can find a the report on their website. In the day or so after the report dropped I got dozens of messages from people asking for my opinion on it, indicating that the report gained some serious traction with policy makers, journalists and general Moldova watchers. I’ve resisted writing about the report (and surrounding controversy) up until this point because criticizing an academic paper didn’t neatly fit into my established content plan at Moldova Matters and because a lot of my initial reaction to reading it was more of a “gut feeling” of uneasiness than an easily identifiable professional critique.
As time has gone on however I’ve begun seeing some of the issues with the Crisis Group report pop up in other publications and coverage about Moldova - not all of which is publicly shared. So I thought I would take another look now and in the spirit of the new “Perspective” section share some thoughts.
Unpacking the Crisis Group Report
The first thing to mention is that by and large the report is thorough, professional and gives a strong overview of Moldova’s current political and international challenges. I’ve had a lot of respect for the International Crisis Group for some years and I often enjoy their podcast War and Peace. So right up front I want to make clear that this article isn’t setting out to bash the organization.
At the same time, the reaction to the report in Moldova was not positive. Former Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu posted a “strongly worded” thread on twitter about it saying (in part):
"Recent @CrisisGroup report on Moldova contains two dozen factual mistakes, significant omissions, skewed language. Good research is supposed to help conflict settlement. Bad research leading to bad analysis - hampers it."
Speaking to local friends and contacts this take seemed pretty popular - basically, that the report was substantially biased against Moldova. I agree. But I believe that this bias is somewhat subtle and can tell us about how the international media landscape is shaped, consciously and not, accepting the framing of issues in through a Russian lens.
This issue becomes apparent on page 2 when the report called Moldova a “formally neutral nation.” Moldova is a constitutionally neutral country that has never participated in any foreign conflicts and has gone pretty far out of the way to stay out of the war next door. Russian media regularly frames Chisinau’s preference that Ukraine win the war, and following preference that Russia not get close enough to invade Moldova, as a “violation of neutrality.” Similarly, making investments in the country’s military is also called out with the same language. The report subtly embraces the idea that Moldova is not neutral in other places as well - saying that Moldova gets assistance from "Western allies" in various areas including energy and combating disinformation. Normally such relationships would be called “partnerships” reflecting the lack of a formal alliance.
Later the report discusses Moldova’s “new” foreign policy of pursuing EU membership. Setting aside the fact that all governments since Voronin have sought closer EU ties, the reasons for this supposed pivot are telling in their omission. The report says that a series of 2 energy crises, as well as the outbreak of war, caused Moldova to change directions.
In the first crisis (fall 2021) it claims that Russia restricted gas supplies due to historical debts. The report goes on to say that Moldova promised “to resolve the debt issue" and signed a new contract. In reality, Moldova did not accept the premise of this debt and hired international auditors who later found it to be fraudulent. The international auditors are also left out of the report which says that “Based on its own audit, Moldova also disclaimed the debt assessed by Gazprom.”
Things get even more stark when they discuss the second energy crisis of winter 2023. In this one the report notes that Russia slashed the amount of gas provided to Moldova and noted that Russia claimed that the disruptions were caused by Ukraine. What did Moldova say? Or Ukraine? Or international experts? We wouldn’t know from this report. The Russian version is provided with little challenge.
I want to be clear, the report identifies Russia as “meddling” in Moldovan affairs and does not tell a story from the Russian perspective. But it does accept their premises at times and goes very light on assigning blame to Russia for things that just seem to happen to Moldova. Noting that the PAS party’s approval ratings are falling in "large part due to Moldova’s economic malaise" the report does not examine what exactly caused the economy to have trouble.
Overall, Russia is described as “meddling” in Moldova and occasionally “threatening” Moldova. At one memorable point, attempts to interfere in Moldova’s elections are called "Russian mischief." Moldova does not get the same light touch in language. The Chisinau government is described as a “bully” towards Transnistria and Gagauzia as well as "heavy handed" and "threatening." Usually these terms are used in the context of the central government’s relationship with Transnistria and Gagauzia.
About Transnistria and Gagauzia
Much of the report focuses on analyzing the relationship between Chisinau, Tiraspol and Comrat and making suggestions towards reducing tensions and negotiating a long term settlement. No one can disagree with those goals and the report does a good job outlining some of the history underlying Moldova’s internal tensions. What is badly mangled is the analysis of the current situation and the existing players.