Perspective: If you think Moldova is divided, think again

Guest Article by Nicu Popescu

Despite Russia organising a massive vote-buying scheme, it failed to significantly influence the elections.

Rather than showing signs of a divided nation, the numbers and simplified comparisons with other countries tell a different story—one of the resilience of Moldova’s choice for a European future, despite facing dangerous geopolitical headwinds and challenging economic conditions, writes Nicu Popescu.

Nicu Popescu is a distinguished fellow at ECFR. He served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova.

There is a striking paradox in how two recent election results are interpreted in policy circles and public debates.

US President-elect Donald Trump’s victory was depicted as a crushing success after winning 50.5% of the popular vote while being voted by the same number of 74 million voters as in 2020. However, the results of recent elections in Moldova - where a pro-EU referendum won by 50.4% and incumbent President Maia Sandu with an 11% lead - were presented as mostly less than convincing wins.

In recent years economic and geopolitical pressures have created a historically hostile environment for incumbents, leading to sweeping losses in the US, UK, France, and beyond. From the US Democrats and UK Conservatives to Germany’s collapsing coalition, governing parties have suffered massive setbacks in many democracies. This year alone, incumbents in ten major democracies faced significant voter backlash.

Moldova, whose economy has been severely impacted by the war in Ukraine and a wave of crises—refugee, energy, economic, and security—would, in theory, be a prime candidate for a major setback for the incumbent leadership.

Yet, in Moldova, Sandu’s support base remains steady compared to her 2020 results. In 2024, she won by an 11% margin. Her total votes dipped slightly, from 943,000 in 2020 to 930,000 in 2024, with the pro-European referendum reflecting a similar trend.

Within Moldova (discounting diaspora), she received 660,000 in 2024 votes, compared to 699,000 in 2020, while diaspora support increased from 244,000 to 270,000. This stability is a testament to Moldovans’ continued dedication to European integration despite a volatile regional context and intensifying Russian interference.

Certainly, there is voter dissatisfaction in Moldova, but the commitment to a continued pro-EU course has proven even stronger.

Sandu’s opponent in the presidential runoff, Alexandr Stoianoglo, tried to position himself as a centrist, claiming support for EU integration while advocating equidistance, a so-called “multi-vector” policy, that includes strong ties with both Russia and the West.

His stance attracted voters tired of choosing sides. Stoianoglo did not challenge the EU openly, nor did he run an explicitly anti-EU campaign. While he clearly benefited from the backing of all pro-Russian forces in Moldova, not all his supporters are pro-Russian.

A significant portion, perhaps even the majority, favour balanced relations between East and West, not a pro-Russian shift—and they are not the majority.

His votes, totalling around 750,000, just exceeded the support for Igor Dodon, the leader of the Socialist Party, who received in 2020 (690,000). It shows that Stoianoglo’s campaign was less about swaying new voters and more about repackaging old loyalties.

Backed by a Russia-orchestrated vote-buying network, Stoianoglo’s gains were bolstered through extensive interference rather than a genuine shift in public sentiment.

The scale of Russian interference in Moldova’s election was staggering. Law enforcement uncovered a vote-buying scheme involving around 10% of voters, with SMS notifications from a sanctioned Russian bank reaching 138,000 unique numbers who installed the bank's application in order to receive money transfers from Russia for their votes.

Additionally, lists with phone numbers and names seized during police searches indicate an even broader cash distribution scheme, revealing a larger-scale attempt to sway the election.

Russian interference extended to disrupting diaspora voting, with false bomb threats at about a dozen overseas polling stations and cyberattacks targeting the voting process abroad.

Moldovan voters still chose Sandu and narrowly supported the EU in the referendum, despite a massive vote-buying scheme. Without the interference, support for the EU and Sandu would likely have been resounding.

As Moldova moves forward, justice reform and economic growth are both urgent priorities. To shield Moldova from Russian interference, justice reform must include a rapid and comprehensive overhaul of institutions, as well as protections for judges brave enough to stand up to former oligarchs and undue influences.

Moldova must also boost its economy to show that democracy can deliver tangible results that improve citizens’ daily lives. As in any democracy, voters in Moldova have been severely impacted by inflation, economic disruptions, and energy worries. Many who backed Maia Sandu and supported EU integration certainly expect the government to take more action to alleviate the economic shocks the country faced in recent years.

As a newly re-elected president, Sandu will need to reach out to the 44% who did not vote for her. The coming year will once again test the resilience and patience of Moldovan voters as they head into parliamentary elections.

Yet, calling Moldova a divided country dithering on its EU aspirations is a false narrative. The most cursory glance at the number of votes cast in 2024 compared to 2020 makes this clear. The total numbers have not changed much. What changed is Russia rolling out a massive vote-buying scheme and failing to significantly shift electoral outcomes in Moldova.

The upcoming parliamentary elections present new challenges, but this past election underscores the resilience of Moldova’s pro-European stance. In a world where many incumbents are losing ground, Sandu’s continued support is a powerful statement of Moldova’s direction and the strength of its democratic resolve.

This article was originally published by Euractiv. All opinions expressed in the article are those of Nicu Popescu and not those of Euractiv or Moldova Matters.