Moldova’s fugitive oligarchs keep spending money on social media platforms despite sanctions
Republished from Euractiv
Welcome back to Moldova Matters! Starting in January 2024 I have begun writing for Euractivas a freelance writer covering Moldova in a new series of articles sponsored by EMIF. This article is part of that series and was originally published on Euractiv’s website.
Even with US sanctions in place, fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor and his affiliates continue to spread Russian disinformation in Moldova using the social media platform Facebook.
In a year that will see a referendum on joining the EU and a presidential election in Moldova, Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign through Shor and other proxies is gaining steam and also fueling Facebook’s profits.
Shor has become the central figure in Russia’s hybrid warfare against Moldova since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Shor is currently residing in Russia after having been convicted in Moldova for his role in the 2014 theft of $1 billion from three Moldovan banks, which he used, as well as funds from people he calls “sponsors” in Russia, to illicitly fund various affiliated political parties, bribe voters, and bankroll violent anti-government protests in Moldova.
For these actions, Shor has been sanctioned by the US, EU, UK and Canada.
Despite the sanctions, Shor and other fugitive oligarchs continue spending money on advertising on American tech platforms such as Meta.
In a report published on 9 July, Moldovan NGO Watchdog tracked Shor’s spending on Facebook and found that parties and individuals linked to Shor spent at least €30,000 on the platform in June. This represents a 136% increase compared to their spending one month before.
Previous Watchdog reports have shown that Shor had spent at least €378,700 on Facebook from when he was sanctioned in October 2022 until early June.
The report noted that the Moldovan government has no direct mechanisms to stop the spread of Russian and oligarch-financed disinformation but can only request the companies remove ads and fake accounts post facto.
“When it comes to notifying companies like META, we follow a formal procedure, which typically involves coordination between various government departments,” Moldovan government spokesperson Daniel Vodă told Euractiv.
“These bodies work together to monitor and report any suspicious activities and afterwards this information is referred to our liaison at META,” Vodă added.
He also noted that various civil society groups also closely track illicit spending and notify Meta and other tech companies of breaches of the platform’s own rules.
When Meta’s representatives are notified and provided with proof, they move quickly to remove the content, Vodă added.
Meta reacts to public pressure
In May, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Moldova and appeared in a joint press conference alongside Moldova’s President Maia Sandu.
Asked about Facebook accepting money from Shor and violating US sanctions, Blinken said Washington would “always urge these social media platforms to enforce their own laws/regulations.”
Whether by coincidence or in response to this public pressure, the same day, Facebook removed 1,326 Facebook accounts and 80 pages and groups linked to Shor.
Shortly thereafter, it added that Shor and many of his political allies, including the sitting Bahkan (governor) of Gagauzia, Evghenia Guțul, to their list of “dangerous organisations and individuals”.
This resulted in the removal of their personal accounts from Facebook.
Not the only big spender
Another fugitive oligarch, Veaceslav Platon, is also a major spender on US social platforms.
He has been sanctioned by Canada over his efforts in support of the Russian destabilisation of Moldova, but not by the US, EU, or the UK, where he currently resides.
Platon’s ad spending also increased in June with €25,250 spent on Facebook alone, a 37% increase compared to the month before.
This information, provided in a report by Watchdog, only tracked Facebook spending and does not include money Platon spends with Google, where he is a major spender on YouTube and Google Ads.
While Shor’s ads promote overtly pro-Russian and anti-EU messaging, Platon’s ads are more nuanced, mostly attacking the Moldovan government and Sandu as un-democratic, and claiming that Moldova’s EU referendum this October is only a political ploy by the liberal ruling PAS party to stay in power.
They also downplay threats from Russia, claiming that they are made up by the PAS government.
Most critically, Platon’s advertisements focus on promoting his romantic partner Natalia Morari, Moldova’s top anti-corruption journalist, whose career imploded in September 2021 when she revealed that she was romantically involved with Platon, with whom she has a child.
She had failed to disclose that when covering an earlier election campaign that Platon participated in, or when she moderated a TV debate where Platon was a participant.
This led to her dismissal from the television station she had co-founded and drew condemnation of her ethical conduct from independent journalists and politicians.
On Thursday (18 July), Morari announced that she was running for president as an independent candidate.
Meanwhile, Platon is a wanted fugitive and is spending money on overtly political advertisements and disinformation campaigns in Moldova.
If these ads were running in the US, EU, or other countries subject to Meta’s political advertising policy, they would almost certainly be in breach of the company’s policies.
Escalating disinformation, few remedies
Watchdog’s most recent report stressed that the government has only limited tools to stop this illicit spending and what it called a “massive wave of disinformation” it spreads.
It noted that more media and civil society engagement could counter this by providing citizens with correct information.
Most importantly, Watchdog stated that a solution is for Meta and Google to become more proactive in fighting disinformation and spending on their platforms by sanctioned individuals.
In Moldova, neither company currently employs any content moderators and manages issues through offices in Romania, whose staff may not be closely familiar with the social or political context in Moldova and most likely do not speak Russian.
In the past, Facebook has proved that they are capable of removing disinformation and propaganda networks – such as those run by the Islamic State – when they choose to do so.
Despite the sanctions and direct engagement with the Moldovan government, Facebook is currently not managing the “massive wave of disinformation” on its platform and is continuing to make a profit from attempts to undermine the democratically elected government of Moldova.
This article is part of the FREIHEIT media project on Europe’s Neighbourhood, funded by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF).
[Edited by Alexandra Brzozowski/ Zoran Radosavljevic]